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Non-technical summary 
Knowledge is an essential input for firms’ innovation processes. The increased 
complexity of such processes and of new technologies leads firms to look for 
valuable knowledge externally to complement their own knowledge and skills. 
This is one reason for the current surge in external knowledge-sourcing. How-
ever, not only the demand for external knowledge has increased – its supply is 
also (potentially) higher. The advent of ICT has made it much easier for firms to 
gain access to external knowledge and to codify, distribute and use this knowl-
edge. Then again, since firm-specific knowledge is an important determinant of 
competitive advantage, firms intensify their efforts to protect their knowledge 
against external access and in doing so limit the supply of freely available in-
formation. It has been argued that one way to achieve both a high level of 
knowledge flow into a firm and sufficiently protect internal knowledge from leak-
ing out is to cooperate in R&D.  
 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of firms’ R&D co-operation deci-
sions in general, focusing in particular on the role of incoming and outgoing 
knowledge spillovers. To enhance our analysis we not only investigate the deci-
sion of firms to cooperate in general, but also analyse firms’ decisions to coop-
erate with research institutes and suppliers/customers. 
 
Using firm-level data from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS III) for 
Germany, we find that knowledge flows matter for the R&D co-operation deci-
sions of firms. In particular outgoing spillovers (or rather their prevention 
through appropriability mechanisms) have a significant influence on the propen-
sity to cooperate in innovation projects. While formal protection methods, like 
patents, negatively influence the probability to cooperate, strategic protection 
methods (e.g. secrecy, lead-time advantages) have a positive impact. Compar-
ing our results with those of similar studies in Belgium and Spain, we find that 
most results are in line with those found for the other countries. However, the 
strong negative influence of legal protection on the probability to co-operate in 
R&D seems to be a unique feature of Germany. 
Analysing according to type of co-operation partner shows that there is a dif-
ference of motives, especially with regard to risk-sharing and absorptive capac-
ity, for co-operating with specific partners. The results also suggest that firms’ 
decisions to cooperate with specific partners are not independent of one an-
other. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the determinants of R&D co-operation among German 
manufacturing firms. Using firm level data from the Third Community Innovation 
Survey from Germany, we focus on the role of spillovers in explaining R&D co-
operation. We also investigate firms’ decisions to cooperate with research insti-
tutions or with suppliers and customers. Implementing a two-step estimation 
procedure, we find a positive effect of knowledge flows on the probability of 
R&D co-operation in most model specifications. Additionally, we show that firms 
with high intramural R&D budgets are more likely to cooperate with universities 
and research institutions than with suppliers and customers. 
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1 Introduction 
Knowledge is an essential input for firms’ innovation processes. The in-
creased complexity of such processes and of new technologies leads firms to 
look for valuable knowledge outside their own boundaries to complement their 
own knowledge and skills. This is one reason for the current surge in external 
knowledge sourcing. However, not only the demand for external knowledge has 
increased – its supply is also (potentially) higher. The advent of ICT has made it 
much easier for firms to gain access to external knowledge and to codify, dis-
tribute and use this knowledge. Then again, since firm-specific knowledge is an 
important determinant of competitive advantage, firms intensify their efforts to 
protect their knowledge against external access and in doing so limit the supply 
of freely available information. This is one reason why appropriability mecha-
nisms like patents, copyright protection and secrecy have become more impor-
tant.  
One way to achieve both a high level of knowledge flow into a firm and suf-
ficiently protect internal knowledge from leaking out is to cooperate in R&D1. In 
cooperative R&D agreements, partners can decide on how much knowledge is 
to be exchanged, thus determining directly the level of voluntary knowledge 
flow. The amount of knowledge that can be exchanged is, however, constrained 
by the technological proximity of the partners and their general ability to utilize 
external knowledge (“absorptive capacity”). Related theoretical and empirical 
analysis has shown that technological closeness and high absorptive capacity 
increase the flow of knowledge between partners and consequently raise the 
incentive to engage in R&D co-operation. Additionally, the amount of knowledge 
exchanged is usually larger if firms co-operate than if they tap into each others 
knowledge pools without co-operating. 
One recent contribution to this strain of literature is the paper by Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002). They empirically investigate the role of knowledge and 
                                              
1We use the term “R&D co-operation” in this text because it has become the common term 
used to describe co-operation as it is surveyed in the community innovation surveys of Eu-
rostat. Note however that the CIS III survey for Germany was asking for innovation co-
operation, which is the broader concept. 
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absorptive capacity in the R&D co-operation decisions of Belgium firms, focus-
ing on finding differences between the effect of knowledge flow into firms (“in-
coming spillovers”) and that of outbound knowledge flow (and their prevention) 
on firms’ decisions to enter into an R&D co-operation. Indeed, they find different 
effects of incoming spillovers, measured by the importance of external knowl-
edge available to each firm, and appropriability, measured by the importance of 
strategic protection methods for internal knowledge, on the probability of co-
operation in R&D projects. 
Their model was modified and applied to Spanish firms by Lopez (2004). He 
focuses in particular on the role of cost- and risk-sharing of innovation projects 
for the co-operation decision taking into account the endogeneity of these con-
cepts. His results confirm the conclusions of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 
that spillovers and appropriability play an important part in influencing R&D co-
operation decisions. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the relationship between 
knowledge flows and R&D co-operation in the German manufacturing sector. In 
order to compare the results with those from Belgium and Spain, we estimate a 
model that is similar to the models used in these two studies. We deviate, how-
ever, by using a different measure of absorptive capacity -- intramural R&D 
budgets -- instead of an indicator of permanent R&D. 
In the next section we describe the motives for R&D co-operation men-
tioned in the relevant literature. In Section 3 we explain how the empirical model 
is set up. Section 4 contains a description of the data and gives details on the 
operationalisation of the core concepts. Finally, the results presented in Section 
5 are followed by our conclusions in Section 6. 
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2 Motives for Co-operation from Related Literature 
Both the theoretical and empirical studies on firms’ co-operation decisions 
have identified an array of motives for and determinants of co-operation (an ex-
tensive overview can be found in Caloghirou et al., 2003). These can be catego-
rized into three main groups: motives related to knowledge, motives related to 
cost- and risk-sharing, and determinants related to firm characteristics.2 
The first group of motives is related to firms’ in- and outbound flows of 
knowledge.  De Bondt & Veugelers (1991) show that the level of incoming spill-
overs -- the knowledge a firm acquires from external sources – positively influ-
ences the attractiveness of R&D co-operation. 
The effect of outgoing spillovers on co-operation is more ambiguous. If a 
firm’s ability to protect its internal knowledge (appropriability) is limited, resulting 
in larger (involuntary) outgoing spillovers, the incentive to cooperate increases; 
firms are able to control (read: restrict) the outflow of knowledge to competitors 
who are not involved in the co-operation through collaborative agreements. The 
scale of the incentive generated depends on the structure of the market in ques-
tion. If these markets are characterized by perfect competition, the incentive to 
limit outflows of knowledge through co-operation should be weak, as a firm can 
only cooperate with a limited number of competitors: Limiting the outflow of 
knowledge can only be partially achieved. Contrarily, if a firm is the leader of an 
oligopoly, the incentive to use co-operation to limit spillovers to competitors 
should be greater; in this case most knowledge outflows can be controlled. A 
high level of outgoing spillovers may, however, also discourage involvement in 
R&D cooperations by increasing the incentive to free-ride on a partner's R&D 
investment, i.e., cheat within the cooperative agreement (see Kesteloot and 
Veugelers, 1994). In addition, outgoing spillovers motivate parties outside an 
                                              
2 Note, in this paper we only focus on one side of the cooperation, in the sense, that we do not take into 
account the “hampering factors” for cooperation. Firms might for example not be able to find an 
(adequate) partner for cooperating. This aspect was neglected here because the data available to us 
doesn’t allow us to identify the exact partners participating in a co-operation. Because of that we 
can’t analyse how the structure and set-up of the partners has influenced a firm’s decision to engage 
in cooperative R&D or not. 
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agreement to free-ride on the investments of R&D partnerships (Greenlee and 
Cassiman, 1999). Both effects reduce the attractiveness of R&D co-operations.  
The notion that incoming and outgoing spillovers and appropriability have 
their own distinct effects on the probability to cooperate was tested by an em-
pirical study by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). They find a significant and 
positive effect of level of incoming spillovers and appropriability on probability of 
co-operation. 
One other topic closely related to knowledge flow is “absorptive capacity”. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that absorptive capacities are necessary “to 
identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment” (p. 569). A 
firm with high absorptive capacities should thus be able to access a larger 
amount of knowledge than a firm with lower such capacities. Consequently, the 
benefit of cooperating and, in doing so, gaining access to knowledge not avail-
able in the public domain will be higher for the former. Since absorptive capaci-
ties can, according to Cohen and Levinthal (1989), be built up by investing in in-
house R&D, it is not surprising that empirical studies have found that the 
amount of internal R&D spending is closely linked to the co-operation decision 
(see Veugelers, 1997). 
 
A second group of motives for R&D co-operation is related to resource con-
straints within a firm. Practically no firm has all the necessary knowledge, com-
petencies, and financial means to undertake an innovation project on its own. 
Hagedoorn (1993) finds that technological complementarities are one of the 
most important reasons for firms to cooperate in R&D. If the need for knowledge 
and skills complementary to a firm’s own knowledge can not be satisfied via the 
market (e.g. due to market imperfections), the firm’s incentive to cooperate in-
creases. Access to complementarities is not only a motive for co-operation in 
general, but in particular for R&D co-operation as R&D and innovation projects 
usually require a larger amount and more specific assets than other projects of 
the firm. 
A lack of financial resources for innovation projects is another motive for 
R&D co-operation related to resource constraints. Sakakibara (1997) supports 
this view, identifying two basic motives for co-operation: cost-sharing and skill-
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sharing. She argues that firms try to reduce their own project costs by cooperat-
ing with external partners. Expensive projects usually also bear a high risk for 
the firms undertaking them. Thus, risk-sharing is also a reason why firms coop-
erate with external partners. The increasing complexity and cost of research 
projects further enhances the role of these motives. Tether (2000) found analyz-
ing data from the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS II) that the grow-
ing complexity of technological innovations has indeed led to more cooperative 
behaviour in the UK. 
 
Finally, the third group of determinants of R&D co-operation lies within the 
structure of the firm and the industry in which it operates. There have been 
many studies investigating the role of firm size as a factor influencing the R&D 
co-operation decision. Most authors conclude that the probability of co-
operation increases with size (e.g., Röller et al. (2001)). As far as the industry of 
the firm is concerned, Dachs et al. (2004) argue that the industry structure, with 
respect to intensity of competition, technological intensity, and appropriability 
conditions of the respective industry influences a firm’s R&D co-operation deci-
sion. 
 
Few empirical models try to distinguish between different types of co-
operation partners or investigate the motives for co-operation with one specific 
partner. However, their number has been increasing in recent years (Belderbos 
(2004); Fontana et al. (2003); Dachs et al. (2004); Veugelers and Cassiman 
(2003); Kaiser (2002)). Kaiser (2002), for example, uses a nested logit model to 
investigate the R&D co-operation decision as a two-stage process: First, the 
firm decides whether to co-operate or not; in the second stage it chooses a co-
operation partner. The results of the studies estimating separate equations for 
different R&D co-operation partners suggest that there are indeed different mo-
tives for co-operating with universities, competitors and suppliers or customers. 
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3 The Empirical Model 
The motives for R&D co-operation proposed by the related literature are the 
starting point for our empirical analysis. We model the probability of a firm being 
engaged in at least one R&D co-operation depending on the motives presented 
in Figure 1. To be able to estimate the influence of these motives, we assign 
one or more specific empirical measures (variables) to each motive. The ex-
pected direction of the impact of the motives for co-operation is (as well as the 
motives themselves) derived from the literature. 
Figure 1: Factors influencing a firm’s decision to have at least one R&D co-
operation with external partners in the empirical model 
 
 
Elaborating on the blueprint presented in Figure 1, the variables used in our 
empirical model are outlined below. The exact construction of these variables is 
presented in Section 4 and the annex. 
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Our main concern is investigating the impact of knowledge flows on a firm’s 
R&D co-operation decision. The importance of external information sources, 
representing the knowledge flows into a firm (incoming spillovers), is thus in-
cluded in the model. Two variables describing the importance of legal and stra-
tegic protection methods for inventions and innovations are included in the em-
pirical model. The importance of protection methods is used as an inverse 
measure of outgoing spillovers since the use of protection methods usually lim-
its the availability of knowledge outside a firm. In this respect formal and strate-
gic methods differ, however. Patents for example require firms to disclose some 
of their knowledge and restrict the usability of this knowledge, while secrecy lim-
its knowledge flows per se, but impose no restrictions on the usage of knowl-
edge that nonetheless leaks out. 
We follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who argue that R&D activities not only 
generate new knowledge but also enhance a firm’s ability to “identify, assimilate 
and exploit knowledge from the environment” (p.569) (Absorptive capacity) and 
thus raises its ability to profit from external sources in general and cooperation 
in particular, as discussed in section 2. Absorptive capacity is proxied by the to-
tal amount spent on R&D in our model. 
The motives not directly related to knowledge flows can also be investigated in 
our empirical model. The importance of risk and cost as obstacles to innovation 
activities is a fairly direct measure of the importance of the cost- and risk-
sharing motive for R&D co-operation, and is hence part of the empirical model. 
The more firms are hampered by a lack of finance for innovation activities or by 
excessive risk involved in potential innovative activities, the more they will be 
willing to share the risk with others. Complementary knowledge as a motive for 
R&D co-operation is represented in our empirical model by the importance of 
the lack of appropriate knowledge as an obstacle to innovation.3 This is not a 
direct measure of the need for complementary knowledge it nonetheless re-
flects the need of firms to get access to knowledge which they themselves don’t 
possess and can thus be used as a proxy. 
The size of a firm and its industry are not the same kind of motives as those 
presented above. They nonetheless influence the decision to cooperate in R&D 
                                              
3 Rocha (1999) p.256-258 provides an overview of cooperation and complementary knowledge.  
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and are thus included in the model. The size of a firm should positively influence 
the likelihood of a firm being involved in at least one R&D co-operation. As a 
firm’s number of employees grows, it tends to be involved in more and more 
distinct innovation projects simultaneously. Its pool of potential co-operation 
partners consequently becomes larger; hence, the likelihood of a firm being in-
volved in at least one R&D co-operation increases. Specific features of certain 
industries – such as the number of enterprises -- not captured by the other vari-
ables in our empirical model are likely to have an influence on the probability to 
cooperate in R&D as well. If an industry is highly concentrated, for example, 
there are less potential co-operation partners. Additionally, innovation activities 
in some industries intrinsically require more external knowledge than others and 
should thus evince a higher probability of co-operation. 
 
The formal empirical model looks like this: 
 
´* coopi i iCooperation X ub= +   with  
1 * 0
0
i
i
if Cooperation
Cooperation
otherwise
>ì
= í
î
 
 
where coopiX  is the column vector representing the variables presented above. 
In this specification all variables are treated as exogenous. As Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) and Lopez (2004) have shown, this might not be the case for 
some of the variables included in our model. In our estimation, some of the 
variables described below should be treated as endogenous: 
We assume total amount spent on intramural R&D to be endogenous since on 
the one hand, co-operation should lead to the reduction of a firm’s own R&D 
through cost- and work-sharing actions; on the other, high R&D budgets in-
crease the incentive to cooperate as shown in the literature.  
The exogeneity of the importance of risk and/or cost as an obstacle to innova-
tion activities is at least debatable. If a firm perceives the cost and risk of a 
planned innovation project to be prohibitively high, it might be inclined to co-
operate with another firm in order to lower these factors. However, actually co-
operating with external partners also reduces the risk and cost of projects for an 
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individual firm. Lopez (2004) models the cost and risk variables as endogenous, 
whereas Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) do not. To yield comparable with both 
studies, we set up two models: One where cost and risk are treated as exoge-
nous variables and one where the two variables are endogenous. 
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the endogeniety of the vari-
ables used to capture the importance of external sources of innovation and the 
importance of strategic protection methods. Both influence the decision to co-
operate and are at the same time influenced by the co-operation behavior of a 
firm. A firm which is co-operating in order to obtain knowledge from external 
sources is very likely to assign a higher importance to external sources than a 
non-cooperating firm. The same is true for strategic protection methods for in-
novation. The perceived importance of strategic protection methods (“appropri-
ability” 4) is likely to increase with co-operation, since the firm faces the problem 
that despite interacting with a partner more closely than without co-operation, 
the partners should not be able to access knowledge beyond those supposed to 
be exchanged through the co-operative agreement.5  
To take the endogeneity of the variables into account, the simple model has 
been augmented and a two-step procedure introduced. In the first step we re-
gress the endogenous variables on all the exogenous variables along with 
some additional instruments (see Section 4) and then calculate the predicted 
values of the endogenous variables. These predicted values are then used in 
the second stage regressions in order to find the determinants of R&D co-
operation. Since the independent variable of the structural equation is binary, it 
was estimated using a probit estimation procedure. According to Greene 
(1981), the standard errors of the second-stage coefficients would be biased if 
the two-step method were applied. In order to correct for this bias, we bootstrap 
the standard errors for the second stage. 
 
                                              
4 In line with Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) , we use the term “appropriability” for the impor-
tance of strategic protection methods.  
5 Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also argue in favour of endogenising the importance of stra-
tegic protection methods. Their argument is that this firm-level variable is subject to meas-
urement errors which can be corrected a two-step procedure.  
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The full model for the specification with the variables for cost- and risk-sharing 
as exogenous variables takes the following form: 
 
· · · ´
0 1 2 3* _ _
coop
i i ii i iCooperation Spill in Approp RD budget X ua a a a b= + + + + +  
 
with 
  
1 * 0
0
i
i
if Cooperation
Cooperation
otherwise
>ì
= í
î
 
 
The first-step equations: 
 
' '
0_
coop
i i i iSpill in Z X vc c d= + + +  
' '
0
coop
i i i iApprop Z X el l s= + + +  
' '
0_
coop
i i i iRD budget Z X kh h J= + + +  
 
where coopiX  is the column vector representing the exogenous explanatory 
variables of the structural equation. iZ  is the column vector of the instruments 
used in the first step regressionsTP6PT (see Section 3).  
· · ·_ , , _i iiSpill in Approp RD Budget  represent the predicted values calculated from 
the three first-step OLS regressions, for incoming spillovers, appropriability, and 
total intramural R&D expenditures, respectively. 
 
If the cost- and risk-sharing variables are treated as endogenous variables, 
two additional equations are necessary: 
 
' '
0
coop
i i i iCost Z X lV V t= + + +  
' '
0
coop
i i i iRisk Z Xy y z w= + + +  
                                              
TP
6
PT Angrist, J. and B. Krueger (2001) argue that it is best to use OLS regressions in the first stage even if the 
dependent variable is binary or censored. 
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and the 2nd-stage equation becomes: 
 
· · · · · ´
0 1 2 3 4 5* _ _
coop
i ii i ii i iCooperation Spill in Approp RD budget Cost Risk X ra a a a a a b= + + + + + + +
 
with · ·,i iCost Risk  being the two additional predicted values from the first-stage 
regressions. 
The empirical models with which we try to explain the decision to cooperate 
with a specific group of partners are set up analogously. 
 
4 Data and Construction of the Variables 
For this study we use firm-level data from the Third Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS III), which was carried out in 2001 and examined innovation activi-
ties during the period 1998 - 2000. In Germany, the CIS III survey was con-
ducted by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. It is part of a larger effort 
to gather data on the innovation behavior of German firms in industry and ser-
vices through annual innovation surveys called the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP).7 Since some of the questions necessary for the construction of our vari-
ables are not included in more recent MIP surveys, we used the CIS III data. 
CIS III was conducted in all of the EU member states (plus Norway) and allows 
comparisons among countries with respect to firms’ innovation behavior.8 The 
representative survey was not mandatory in Germany, which led to significant 
problems with non-response.  
                                              
7 A detailed description of the survey can be found in Janz et al. (2001) 
8 Note that Cassiman and Veugelers (2004) and Lopez also used the CIS data for their study. 
This should increase the comparability of our results with theirs considerably, since all coun-
tries use a harmonized questionnaire and methodology for the Community Innovation Sur-
veys. 
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Of the 2,020 manufacturing firms which returned the questionnaire, we only 
use those which had been innovative.9  This reduction is necessary because 
only innovative firms were required to answer questions regarding their coop-
erative behavior and others related to innovation activities. This restriction does 
not pose a problem, however, as we only wish to investigate the R&D co-
operation decision and not the co-operation decision in general. Restricting our 
sample to innovative firms, we are left with 1,278 (63%). However, only 1,016 of 
these 1,278 firms provided answers to all the questions necessary for the con-
struction of the variables required for our analysis. The reduction of the sample 
to the 1,016 firms for which all data is available is likely to have introduced 
some selection bias, but we consider it small enough to be neglected.  
The sample contains 301 (30%) externally co-operating innovators. Of these 
cooperating firms, 208 cooperated with suppliers and customers and 237 with 
research institutions.10 The descriptive statistics show that there are differences 
between cooperating and non-cooperating firms not only with respect to their 
inward and outward knowledge flows, but also to other variables like amount of 
intramural R&D.  
 
The variables we included in the empirical model were constructed as fol-
lows11: 
 
Incoming Spillovers: Volume of incoming spillovers can not be measured di-
rectly using the CIS III questionnaire. In order to be able to include incoming 
spillovers in the model in spite of this, we included a question in which firms 
were asked to assess the importance of different sources of information for their 
innovation activities in the CIS III questionnaire. They were given four catego-
ries to choose from, ranging from not used (0) to highly important (3). To con-
struct the incoming spillover variable we only use two of the twelve sources the 
firms were asked to rate, namely professional conferences, meetings and jour-
                                              
9 A firm has been labeled „innovative“ if it had either introduced a product or process innovation, 
had ongoing innovation projects, or abandoned innovation activities during the three year 
period 1998-2000.  
10 Additional descriptive statistics from the sample can be found in Table 1 of the annex. 
11 The construction of each variable is described in the annex. 
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nals as one source and exhibitions and fairs as the other.12 The scores for these 
sources are summed up and divided by the maximum sum of scores possible 
(6) to rescale the firm-specific measure between zero (not used) and one 
(highly important). 
 
Appropriability: To construct an inverse measure of outgoing spillovers we use 
information on the importance of strategic methods to protect innovations and 
inventions. Like the variable for incoming spillovers, this is only a proxy of the 
level of outgoing spillovers. The question we applied asked the firms to rate the 
importance of protection methods for innovations, ranging from not used (0) to 
highly important (3). To obtain the appropriability variable we sum up the scores 
for all the strategic methods (secrecy, complexity of design and lead time) and 
divide the total by the maximum sum possible (9) to rescale the firm-specific 
measure between zero (not relevant) and one (highly important). 
 
Legal Protection: Additionally, the level of outgoing spillovers is proxied by the 
level of legal protection, which is constructed according to the method used for 
appropriability and using formal protection methods (patents, patterns, trade-
marks, copyrights) instead of strategic methods. The legal protection methods 
are treated separately since their effect on outgoing spillovers is not as distinct 
as that of strategic protection methods. Legal protection methods require firms 
to disclose some of their knowledge and thus generate a special kind of outgo-
ing spillovers. This variable was included in the model as an industry-level vari-
able (2digit NACE) by taking the mean of the individual scores in the industry. 13  
 
Absorptive Capacity: To capture the absorptive capacity a firm possesses we 
use the total amount a firm is spending on R&D (“R&D budget”).14 Most other 
empirical studies dealing with similar topics (e.g., Dachs et. al (2004) and 
Fontana et. al (2003)) use R&D intensity (R&D as a percentage of total turn-
                                              
12 This restriction was imposed to yield results comparable with studies from Spain and Bel-
gium. This is certainly a limitation, as other sources of external knowledge (suppliers, cus-
tomers, and competitors) may be more important sources for some firms. 
13 This restriction was imposed to yield results comparable with those from Spain and Belgium.  
14 We also estimated the equations using the logarithm of the intramural R&D budget instead of 
the intramural R&D budget itself. The results were very similar in both cases. 
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over) instead of total amount of R&D expenditures to model the absorptive ca-
pacities of a firm.  In our opinion, however, total amount spent on R&D is a bet-
ter proxy for absorptive capacity than R&D intensity since a large amount of 
R&D spending and not only a large share of R&D in total turnover should lead 
to high absorptive capacities. A small firm with a small turnover volume but a 
high R&D intensity is fairly unlikely to have the same absorptive capacities as a 
large firm with a turnover volume significantly higher than that of the small firm 
and a slightly lower R&D intensity.  
 
Cost- and Risk-sharing: Using a question on the importance of factors ham-
pering innovation activity, we get a direct measure of these motives; the firms 
were asked to assess the importance of high costs and high risk of innovation 
projects as an obstacle to innovation. 
 
Complementarities: To proxy the need for complementary knowledge we 
again use the information on the importance of hampering factors -- to be more 
precise, the importance of a lack of information on technologies -- as an obsta-
cle to innovation. If a firm perceives a lack of information on technology as an 
obstacle to innovation, we assume that it does not have the knowledge it needs 
to conduct innovation activities internally and thus has a need for complemen-
tary knowledge. 
 
Size and Industry: In order to control for the effect of firm size and industry on 
a firm’s R&D co-operation decision we include number of employees and indus-
try level of co-operation (instead of industry dummies) in our estimations. The 
latter is particularly controversial, as most other studies use industry dummies 
to capture the influence of a firm’s industry on its decision to engage in coopera-
tive agreements. Lopez (2004) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), however, 
used the industry level of the co-operation variable. Since one of the aims of 
this paper is to compare the results for Germany with those for Spain and Bel-
gium, we utilize the same method.  
Nevertheless, the size variable used in our study is different from that of Lopez 
(2004) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). Instead of turnover, we use num-
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ber of employees to construct our size variables. This should not influence the 
comparability of the two studies because turnover and number of employees 
are usually quite positively correlated.15  
 
Using a two-step estimation procedure requires the use of instruments in the 
first stage. The following variables are thus used in the first-step OLS regres-
sions as instruments for the endogenous variables in addition to the exogenous 
variables from the structural equations. 
Public support of R&D is included as an instrument for the importance of cost 
as an obstacle to innovation. Our argument is that financial R&D support will 
decrease cost and risk for a firm undertaking a specific innovation project be-
cause it reduces demand for the firm’s own funds to be used within the project. 
We also use this variable as an instrument in the model treating cost and risk 
as exogenous. In this model it is included as an additional instrument for intra-
mural R&D budget since public support is normally complementary to a firm’s 
own R&D spending. Hence, R&D budget should be higher when a firm receives 
public R&D support compared to a situation without R&D support. 
Kamien and Zang (2000) have shown that the benefits of knowledge inflows 
increase if a firm's innovation activities are closer to basic R&D. Thus, the level 
of incoming spillovers should be influenced by the “basicness of R&D” variable 
used in the first-step regression. We try to capture the basicness of R&D by cal-
culating the ratio between the importance of public research as a source of in-
formation for innovations and the importance of information from customers and 
suppliers.  
The level of strategic protection used by a firm depends generally on its com-
petitive environment. We include export share in the first-stage regression to 
capture this effect, arguing that a firm which exports relatively more faces 
harder competition than firms which do not. 
In addition to these instruments we included the industry level of all the vari-
ables we assume to be endogenous, i.e., the industry level of incoming spill-
overs, intramural R&D budgets and appropriability in the first-step regression for 
                                              
15 Because we found differences in the significance of the size variables between our study and 
the ones by Lopez and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we also estimated the models us-
ing turnover to generate the size dummy, however the results didn’t change significantly. 
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specifications -- with cost and risk exogenous – along with the industry level of 
the cost and risk variables in specifications where these variables are endoge-
nous. 
 
5 Results  
In this section we present the results of the various specifications (Table 1)16 
and compare them with the results found for Spain and Belgium. Overall, the 
results are similar to those of the two other countries: Incoming spillovers and 
appropriability play an important role in determining R&D co-operation in most 
cases. The main difference is that legal protection measures are very important 
in the German case for firms’ decisions to engage in R&D co-operation. They 
were of minor importance in Spain and Belgium.  
This encourages a closer look at the German results for the outgoing spillover 
variables. In all specifications the level of legal protection exerts a negative in-
fluence, while the appropriability variable is positively significant. The more im-
portant formal means of protection are for an industry, the less likely firms in 
that industry are to cooperate. One explanation is that firms in industries asso-
ciated with a substantial amount of patenting are more concerned with informa-
tion leaking out to their competitors than those involved in less patent-intensive 
sectors. They are more reserved when it comes to co-operation since they want 
to keep their proprietary knowledge, which they have in addition to the knowl-
edge released in their patent applications, to themselves. 
Furthermore, if legal protection methods are very important in an industry, this 
can be interpreted as an indicator that a lot of firms use protection methods that 
require them to disclose some of their knowledge. The pool of knowledge dis-
seminated through legal protection methods is thus relatively large in industries 
which use legal protection methods intensively. As discussed in Section 2, a 
large pool of outgoing spillovers increases the incentive to free ride on others’ 
R&D investments and thus decreases the incentive to cooperate. This view is 
supported by our results. 
                                              
16 The results for the first step regressions can be found in the Annex. 
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Table 1: Marginal effects for Probit Estimations of Probability of Co-operation 
  Cost and Risk exogenous  Cost and Risk endogenous 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incoming Spillovers 0.513 (I) 0.845*** (I) 0.614 (I) 0.598* (I) 
  (0.360) (0.290) (0.389) (0.350) 
Appropriability 1.098*** (I) 1.105*** (I) 1.380*** (I) 1.374*** (I) 
  (0.225) (0.179) (0.230) (0.210) 
Legal Protection (industry level) -1.680*** -1.468*** -2.203***  -2.200*** 
  (0.434) (0.334) (0.437) (0.409) 
Intramural R&D budget 0.005*** (I)  - 0.0001 (I) -  
  (0.002)   (0.0001)   
Size 0.276** -0.013 0.038 zzz 0.051 zzz 
  (0.129) (0.044) (0.159) (0.053) 
Size, squared -0.028** 0.003 0.002 zzz 0.001 zzz 
  (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) 
Cost 0.102 0.031 1.668*** (I) 1.649*** (I) 
  (0.085) (0.081) (0.451) (0.373) 
Risk -0.021 -0.021 -0.496 (I) -0.476 (I) 
  (0.057) (0.061) (0.563) (0.483) 
Complementarities 0.113* 0.118* 0.440*** 0.440*** 
  (0.065) (0.070) (0.112) (0.121) 
Co-operation (industry level) 1.292*** 1.194*** 1.187*** 1.190*** 
  (0.205) (0.204) (0.213) (0.214) 
Observations 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
X^2 208.49 201.32 211.24 210.89 
Loglikelihood -494.47 -497.74 -480.54 -480.54 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
zzz jointly significant at 1%; zz jointly significant at 5%; z jointly significant at 10% 
(I) Instrumented; Robust standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped to correct for bias in-
duced by two-step procedure) 
For the second measure of outgoing spillovers, appropriability, we find a posi-
tive and significant sign in all of the equations. This variable measures the im-
portance of strategic protection methods which do not require firms to disclose 
any knowledge per se, but rather limit the outflow of knowledge directly. The 
usage of strategic protection methods by other firms thus reduces the level of 
knowledge freely available to any single firm and consequently increases the 
incentive to cooperate as a means of obtaining access to external knowledge. 
Another reason for the positive and significant influence of the appropriability 
variable is that if a firm is able to protect most of its own knowledge through 
strategic protection methods, it is very likely to be able to control the exchange 
of knowledge in a cooperative relationship as well. This would reduce the risk of 
involuntary spillovers in said cooperative agreement and should increase the 
firm’s incentive to co-operate. 
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Incoming spillovers have a positive influence on the probability of R&D co-
operation. However, the empirical evidence is not as strong as for the measures 
of outgoing spillovers. In the equations including the intramural R&D budget 
variable, which is supposed to measure absorptive capacity, the incoming spill-
over variable is insignificant, whereas excluding the intramural R&D budget 
yields a significant effect of incoming spillovers on co-operation. One explana-
tion is that level of absorptive capacity and that of incoming spillovers are corre-
lated to a certain extent, which should be the case according to theory: Higher 
absorptive capacities increase a firm’s ability to assimilate external knowledge, 
thereby increasing its level of both potential and actual incoming spillovers. Our 
research counterparts In Belgium and Spain found positive and significant signs 
for incoming spillovers regardless of the endogeneity structure used and the in-
clusion or exclusion of a measure of absorptive capacity17.  
Another result that is similar among equations (1) to (4) is the role of comple-
mentary knowledge in determining the probability of co-operation. In all four 
equations the probability of a firm engaging in R&D co-operation is higher if its 
need for complementary knowledge is more pronounced. Gaining access to 
complementary technological knowledge can thus indeed be considered a mo-
tive for co-operation. The detailed analysis by type of co-operation partner (see 
below), however, shows that only some types of co-operation are influenced by 
a need for complementary knowledge, among them co-operation with research 
institutions. 
The evidence pointing to financial constraints is mixed: On the one hand we 
find a positive and significant sign for lack of financial resources on the probabil-
ity of R&D co-operation with cost and risk as endogenous variables; on the 
other, lack of financial resources does not influence the decision to form an 
R&D co-operation significantly if cost and risk are treated as exogenous.  
The risk variable has a negative sign in all four equations, but it is not signifi-
cant. Upon first glance the negative sign (also found by Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) in Belgium) for increased risk is surprising, since one would 
expect the incentive to share a project’s risk with other firms in a co-operation to 
                                              
17 Note that Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also found a decrease of the significance level of 
the incoming spillover variable if including a measure for absorptive capacity. 
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increase with that risk. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 18 used the transac-
tions-cost approach to explain the negative sign: As projects become more 
complex and risky, it may be harder to come up with good contracts minimizing 
partners’ opportunistic behavior.  
No definite picture emerges for the intramural R&D budget variable. Depend-
ing on the endogeneity structure of the model, this variable is significant or it is 
not. The highly positive and significant sign in equation (1) together with the 
positive sign in equation (3) at least give some indication that the amount spent 
on R&D positively influences the probability of co-operation. The lack of a more 
significant influence could be explained by higher levels of absorptive capacity 
not only influencing the likelihood of profits from knowledge transferred in a co-
operative agreement but also the possibility of gains from knowledge freely 
available outside the cooperative agreement. If a firm is able to utilize more out-
side knowledge as a result of an increase in its absorptive capacity, it may be 
less willing to join a cooperative agreement and share its own knowledge with 
others. 
Table 2 shows the results of the models used to investigate the determinants 
of decisions to co-operate with different types of partners. 
Regardless of the endogeneity structure used and the inclusion or exclusion of 
the R&D budget variable, we find that incoming spillovers do affect the probabil-
ity of co-operation with research institutions positively and significantly. Appro-
priability and the level of legal protection in an industry are common motives 
behind firms’ decisions to cooperate or forego co-operation despite potential 
partners.  
As one would expect, intramural R&D positively influences the likelihood of co-
operation with research institutes but does not effect decisions on co-operating 
with suppliers. One possible explanation is that absorptive capacities built up 
through a firm’s own R&D spending may be more useful in accessing the more 
basic knowledge resources of universities and research institutes and influence 
the ability to use suppliers’ knowledge only slightly. 
 
                                              
18 Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) p.11 
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Table 2: Marginal Effects for 2-Step Probit Estimations of Probability of Co-operation with Customers/Suppliers and  
Research Institutions 
  Co-operation with suppliers and customers Co-operation with research institutions 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Incoming Spillovers 0.027 (I) 0.188 (I) 0.021 (I) 0.188 (I) 0.764*** (I) 1.072***(I) 0.453** (I) 0.488** (I) 
  (0.265) (0.267) (0.206) (0.267) (0.288) (0.249) (0.171) (0.114) 
Appropriability 0.544*** (I) 0.545*** (I) 0.628*** (I) 0.545*** (I) 1.234***(I) 1.229***(I) 1.388*** (I) 1.398*** (I) 
  (0.189) (0.161) (0.219) (0.161) (0.191) (0.174) (0.215) (0.198) 
Legal Protection (industry level) -0.693** -0.637** -0.896** -0.637** -1.808*** -1.598*** -1.846*** -1.780*** 
  (0.319) (0.227) (0.412) (0.227) (0.378) (0.354) (0.386) (0.394) 
Intramural R&D Budget 0.002 (I)  - 0.001 (I) -  0.005*** (I) -  0.002 *** (I)  - 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)   
Size 0.144 zz 0.011 zzz 0.092 zzz 0.011 zzz 0.226** -0.038 0.130 ** 0.047 zzz 
  (0.099) (0.035) (0.063) (0.035) (0.103) (0.036) (0.059) (0.044) 
Size, squared -0.012 zz 0.002 zzz -0.005 zzz 0.002 zzz -0.025** 0.004 -0.010 ** -0.001 zzz 
  (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Cost 0.033 0.0001  0.518 (I) 0.000 (I) 0.119 0.053 1.411 (I) 1.459* (I) 
  (0.063) (0.255) (0.996) (0.255) (0.073) (0.067) (0.871) (0.846) 
Risk 0.040 0.039 -0.092 (I) 0.039 (I) -0.094* -0.091* -0.113* (I) -0.106 * (I) 
  (0.047) (0.049) (0.109) (0.049) (0.055) (0.051) (0.066) (0.059) 
Complementarities 0.051 0.054 0.156 0.054 0.132** 0.140*** 0.481** 0.499*** 
  (0.050) (0.051) (0.152) (0.051) (0.059) (0.055) (0.261) (0.198) 
1.019*** 1.003*** 0.996*** 1.003*** -  -  -  -  Co-operation with suppliers and  
customers (industry level) (0.222) (0.208) (0.217) (0.208)     
 - -  -  - 1.297*** 1.197*** 0.965*** 0.916*** Co-operation with Research Institu-
tions (industry level)     (0.211) (0.213) (0.157) (0.163) 
Observations 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
X^2 155.57 150.34 154.71 150.34 227.80 223.79 221.65 223.17 
Loglikelihood -430.67 -431.73 -428.97 -431.73 -391.10 -394.94 -372.78 -373.29 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; zzz jointly significant at 1%; zz jointly significant at 5%; (I) Instrumented 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped to correct for bias induced by two-step procedure) 
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One other motive that exclusively influences the decision to cooperate with 
universities is risk-sharing (negative and significant). The negative sign of the 
risk variable can be explained by assuming that a firm decides simultaneously 
on the type of partner it wants to engage. If the perceived risk involved in a pro-
ject is too high, it is more likely to choose to engage a partner that can contrib-
ute significant financial resources and experience rather than significant techno-
logical information. Assuming, that these resources and skills can be more eas-
ily contributed by a commercial firm than by a research institution, firms may be 
inclined to approach the former instead of the latter. The positive sign of the 
cost variable in equation (12) offers no contradiction to this argument. It meas-
ures lack of appropriate financing for innovation projects. In the case of such a 
lack, it might be cheaper to obtain knowledge from a university or research insti-
tute than from a customer or supplier, regardless of the risk involved in a pro-
ject. 
The results also suggest that firms perceive the strength of research institutes 
to lie in the production of relevant and valuable technological knowledge. If firms 
see a lack of appropriate know-how on a certain technology as a factor hamper-
ing their innovation activities, they are more likely to co-operate with research 
institutions than suppliers or customers.  
 
6 Conclusion 
All of our estimations show that knowledge-flows matter for the R&D co-
operation decision of a firm. Outgoing spillovers or their prevention have a par-
ticularly significant influence on the propensity to cooperate in innovation pro-
jects.  
The role of absorptive capacity, measured by amount of intramural R&D ex-
penditure, in determining the probability of a firm co-operating in R&D is less 
clear. We only find a small positive influence for level of R&D spending on the 
likelihood of co-operation. For the decision to cooperate with research institutes, 
however, absorptive capacity is a very important requirement. To improve the 
understanding of the role of absorptive capacity in R&D co-operation decisions 
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in general, future studies will have to investigate more appropriate measures of 
absorptive capacity in greater detail. 
While the results for spillovers are in line with those found in Spain and Bel-
gium, a unique result for the German case is that legal protection methods are 
very important. They have a much more prominent role in determining R&D co-
operation than in other countries that have been studied in similar frameworks 
thus far. We also found that the influence of legal protection methods on the co-
operation decision is quite different from that of strategic protection methods. 
The analysis by type of co-operation partner shows that there is indeed a dif-
ference between motives, especially risk-sharing and absorptive capacity, for 
cooperating with specific partners. The results suggest that firms do not decide 
independently on the type of partners they want to cooperate with. This should 
be taken into account for future studies of this type. With a simultaneous equa-
tion approach one could also test for complementarities between different types 
of R&D co-operation.  
As more and more innovation subsidies are funneled into fostering co-
operation and knowledge spillovers19, it is certainly interesting to see what effect 
public R&D funding has on the propensity to co-operate. 
One other aspect that was excluded from our analysis (but is certainly worth 
considering) is a distinction between foreign and domestic co-operation partners 
and spillovers. 
                                              
19  The sixth framework program of the European Union, for example. 
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8 Annex 
Construction of Variables 
 
Appropriability: Sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 
(high)) of strategic protection methods for innovations (secrecy, complexity of 
design and lead-time advantage). Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 (highly 
important). 
 
Basicness of R&D: Sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 
(high)) of university and government or private non-profit research institutes as 
sources of information over sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) 
and 3 (high)) of suppliers and customers as sources of information 
 
Intramural R&D Budget: Amount spent on innovation activities in the year 
2000 (in millions of euros). 
 
Co-operation: One, if the firm co-operated with suppliers, customers, com-
petitors, consultants, commercial research institutions, universities or public re-
search institutions during the period 1998 - 2000. 
 
Co-operation with suppliers and customers: One, if the firm co-operated 
with suppliers or customers during the period 1998 - 2000. 
 
Co-operation with research institutions: One, if the firm co-operated with 
commercial research institutions, universities or public research institutions dur-
ing the period 1998 - 2000. 
 
Complementarities: Importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) 
of lack of information on technology as an obstacle to innovation. Rescaled be-
tween 0 (not important) and 1 (very important). 
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Cost: Sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) of ob-
stacles to innovations related to costs (Lack of appropriate sources of financing, 
costs too high). Rescaled between 0 (no obstacle) and 1 (very important obsta-
cle). 
 
Export Share 2000: Total exports in 2000 divided by total turnover in 2000.  
 
Incoming Spillovers: Sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) and 
3 (high)) of professional conferences, meetings and journals and of exhibitions 
and fairs as sources of innovation. Rescaled between 0 (no spillovers) and 1 
(maximum spillovers). 
 
Intramural R&D budget: Amount spent on intramural R&D in 2000 (in million 
of euros) 
 
Legal Protection: Sum of importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 
(high)) of formal protection methods for innovations (patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, registration of design patterns). Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 
(highly used). 
 
Risk: Importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) of high eco-
nomic risk as an obstacles to innovations. Rescaled between 0 (no obstacle) 
and 1 (very important obstacle) 
 
Size: Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2000 
 
Size^2: Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2000, squared 
 
Industry level of variable: Mean of the variable at the 2-digit NACE level. 
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Table 3 : Descriptive Statistics a  
 
 Mean  Mean  Mean b Mean b Mean b 
 Sample 
Mean 
Non-Co-
operating 
Firms 
Co-operating 
Firms 
Co-operation 
with suppliers 
or customers 
Co-operation 
with research 
institutions 
Observations 1016 715 301 208 237 
% of total - 70% 30% 20% 23% 
Incoming Spillovers 0,563 0,552 0,589** 0,594** 0,610*** 
 (0,259) (0,256) (0,263) (0,258) (0,257) 
Appropriability 0,342 0,281 0,486*** 0,512*** 0,514*** 
 (0,337) (0,322) (0,327) (0,325) (0,323) 
Legal Protection (industry level) 0,191 0,182 0,211*** 0,213*** 0,215*** 
 (0,070) (0,072) (0,061) (0,059) (0,060) 
Size 4,914 4,568 5,736*** 5,969*** 5,967*** 
 (1,686) (1,481) (1,855) (1,897) (1,906) 
Intramural R&D budgets 6,930 1,045 20,91*** 24,33*** 26,32*** 
 (70,61) (4,473) (128,6) (143,8) (144,5) 
Cost 0,566 0,556 0,590** 0,573 0,601** 
 (0,295) (0,297) (0,289) (0,280) (0,285) 
Risk 0,582 0,558 0,640*** 0,643*** 0,648*** 
 (0,324) (0,326) (0,313) (0,309) (0,310) 
Complementarities 0,688 0,688 0,689 0,691 0,691 
 (0,266) (0,272) (0,253) (0,247) (0,257) 
a standard errors in parenthesis 
b mean difference between non-cooperating and cooperating firms:  
*** significant at 1% level ; ** significant at 5%  level ; * significant at 10% level 
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Table 4: Regression Results, First Step Used in Equations 1 and 2  
 Incoming spillovers Appropriability 
Intramural  
R&D budget 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Size 0.022 0.013 -54.121** 
  (0.018) (0.026) (24.574) 
Size, squared -0.001 0.002 6.000** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (2.663) 
Legal Protection (industry level) -0.213 -0.269 -60.863* 
 (0.204) (0.255) (33.091) 
Cost 0.108*** 0.017 -8.387 
  (0.035) (0.044) (6.952) 
Risk 0.020 0.035 2.610 
  (0.031) (0.039) (5.497) 
Complementarities -0.072** -0.010 -3.173 
  (0.030) (0.041) (6.192) 
Basicness of R&D 0.061*** 0.080*** 2.229 
  (0.015) (0.021) (2.645) 
Export share 2000 -0.025 0.186*** -2.510 
  (0.036) (0.045) (8.121) 
Public R&D Support 0.008 0.002 6.722** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (2.731) 
Co-operation (industry level) -0.117 -0.103 -24.937 
 (0.088) (0.116) (21.945) 
Incoming Spillovers (industry level) 0.779*** -0.143 14.998 
 (0.133) (0.163) (19.494) 
Appropriability (industry level) 0.092 1.106*** 46.271** 
 (0.171) (0.209) (23.316) 
Intramural R&D budget (industry level)  0.001 -0.000 0.828* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.484) 
Constant 0.072 -0.076 104.899** 
  (0.087) (0.111) (49.143) 
Observations 1,016 1,016 1,016 
R-squared 0.10 0.17 0.24 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Regression Results, First Step Used in Equations 3 and 4  
 
 
Incoming 
spillovers Appropriability 
Intramural 
R&D budget Risk Cost 
 (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Size 0.015 0.010 -53.895** -0.066*** -0.053*** 
  (0.018) (0.026) (24.363) (0.022) (0.019) 
Size, squared -0.000 0.003 6.014** 0.007*** 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (2.652) (0.002) (0.002) 
Legal Protection (industry level) -0.035 -0.197 -78.220** -0.311 0.065 
 (0.219) (0.271) (38.379) (0.271) (0.244) 
Complementarities -0.113*** -0.028 -1.489 -0.337*** -0.311*** 
  (0.029) (0.038) (6.424) (0.039) (0.034) 
Basicness of R&D 0.065*** 0.082*** 2.021 0.044** 0.032* 
  (0.016) (0.021) (2.597) (0.018) (0.018) 
Export Share 2000 -0.023 0.189*** -2.683 0.031 -0.040 
  (0.037) (0.045) (8.488) (0.044) (0.040) 
Public R&D Support 0.020 0.006 5.934** 0.048** 0.074*** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (2.475) (0.021) (0.019) 
Co-operation (industry level) -0.140 -0.114 -22.400 0.029 0.054 
 (0.089) (0.117) (20.463) (0.109) (0.093) 
Incoming Spillovers (industry level) 0.802*** -0.120 22.442 0.040 -0.013 
 (0.139) (0.176) (22.085) (0.169) (0.147) 
Appropriability (industry level) 0.014 1.078*** 54.835** 0.014 -0.145 
 (0.176) (0.213) (26.033) (0.214) (0.187) 
Intramural R&D budget (industry level) 0.001 -0.000 0.834* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.484) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost (industry level) -0.272 -0.141 38677 -0.101 0.866*** 
 (0.169) (0.211) (35.242) (0.207) (0.184) 
Risk (industry level) 0.172 0.063 -46362 0.986*** 0.049 
 (0.186) (0.234) (37.932) (0.223) (0.201) 
Constant 0.234** 0.003 100.621** 0.429*** 0.453*** 
  (0.105) (0.131) (44.498) (0.135) (0.115) 
Observations 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
R-squared 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.16 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
